In this paper we review some issues of research in intelligent agents, and particularly some logical theories that have been proposed in the literature to describe aspects of intelligent agents.
Introduction
Intelligent agents have become the subject of much research lately. The eld of agent technology and its foundations lies in between the disciplines of arti cial intelligence and mainstream computer science, in particular that of software engineering. Agents are pieces of software (or hardware) that display a certain degree of autonomy. They are not completely reliant on the user's commands, but are able to react to the environment in an autonomous manner, and, even more remarkable, they will take initiative on their own to perform actions to in uence their environment in a certain desirable way (goal-directed or proactive behaviour). Agents are thus very much`situated' in their environment: they are able to both sense (`perceive') and a ect the environment they inhabit. Therefore, agents can be viewed as successors to the traditional knowledge-based or expert systems which could reason with symbolic representations of some universe of discourse (or knowledge domain), and could render expert-level advise on problems related to that domain. These expert systems thus acted as a kind of arti cial consultants, but could take no actions on their own, and did not a ect an inhabited environment.
On the other hand, programming (in terms of) agents, called agentoriented programming may also be viewed as a successor to the now This tutorial is partially supported by the SURF-project \Landelijk Onderwijsweb Kennistechnologie (LOK)" popular object-oriented (OO) programming paradigm in software engineering. Here one must think typically of designing systems of multiple agents (so-called multi-agent systems (MAS)) that communicate in order to cooperate in some sensible way (for instance to solve a task together). Although objects in the OO setting already possess some kind of autonomy (they have their own data types and methods that can be called by other objects), there is no mention of any autonomy in the sense of displaying initiative or being proactive. In agent-oriented programming these notions are central, and, moreover, communication among agents is much less a matter of just invoking a method of another agent, but rather asking questions to other agents which these other agents may (or may not) handle in their own way. Also the content of communication (the messages itself) seems to be di erent in the sense of higher-level than in OO programming: in MAS's communication may take place involving the typical agent-related notions of beliefs, desires and goals.
Agent notions such as autonomy, reactiveness and proactiveness are often coined by means of the notion of a`mental state'. Such a mental state comprises the attitudes of an agent: informational ones, dealing with knowledge and belief (updating and revising these as new information comes available, thus including reasoning and learning capabilities), and motivational ones, dealing with wishes / desires, goals, intentions, commitments.
Issues
In order to realise agents one should address several aspects at di erent levels. In research on agents the following areas are distinguished: theories, architectures and (agent programming) languages ( 41] ).
Theories concern descriptions of agents, in particular their behaviour, often in terms of their informational and motivational attitudes. Most of these propose (modal) logics for reasoning about these attitudes.
Architectures pertain to more or less generic organisation schemes of how agents are (to be) built, varying from abstract pictures with indications of some essential components to concrete system descriptions.
Languages concern more or less dedicated programming languages designed to program agents in terms of agent concepts (or, using the agent metaphor).
Of course, there are many interrelations between theories, architectues and languages. For example, an agent programming language may be designed using the concepts of some particular agent theory, and may employ or realise some particular agent architecture.
Moreover one has to distinguish the`micro-level' from the`macrolevel': the former pertains to the internal structure of an agent, whereas with the latter the`societal' or`interagent' level is referred to. Both on micro-and macrolevel one can discuss theories, architectural issues and issues with respect to languages. For example, with respect to the internal (`micro'-) level one has the well-known BDI theory of Rao & George 31] , a logic to reason about the agent's beliefs, desires and intentions. Other logical theories for single agents include the approach of Cohen & Levesque ( 2] ) 1 and the KARO logic ( 18] . BDI theory has given rise to an architecture based on the BDI notions, called the BDI architecture. As to languages for single agents there have been several proposals like AgentSpeak(L) ( 30] ), GOLOG ( 23] ) and 3APL 2 ( 16] ).
On the other hand, with respect to the societal (`macro'-) level one has theories about societal behaviour, including aspects of communication, coordination but also norms and obligations etc. Also logical theories concerning mutual and common beliefs, intentions etc. (the multiagent versions of BDI plus typical social notions). There is also the very interesting but somewhat elusive issue of so-called emergent behaviour, constituting behaviour of a multi-agent system (typically with very many agents) that emerges from the interactions between the individual agents, and cannot be predicted from the behaviour from the individual agents. This topic is being investigated extensively. A logical approach to MAS is proposed by e.g. Singh 34] A description of research on architectures and programming languages is beyond the scope of this paper. We now concentrate on theories, and particularly the logics that are involved in these. (As a consequence we will not say much about many more advanced aspects of societal behaviour, such as emergent behaviour, since { although it is being studied extensively { as far as I know { until now, but perhaps necessarily so by its very nature! { it eludes the use of logic for a proper treatment.)
In order to describe (the attitudes of) agents one may resort to logics which are tailored to express the notions above, such as knowledge, belief, desires, goals, etc. Here modal logic comes in as it has been the traditional tool in philosophy to analyse these notions in a systematic and formal, rigorous manner.
We begin with the modal logic(s) of knowledge and belief.
Epistemic and Doxastic Logic
Epistemic (doxastic) logic is the logic of knowledge (belief). It is a modal logic with modal operator K (or B) indicating that the formula that it is given as an argument is known (believed). Stemming from philosophy epistemic and doxastic logic have been adopted by computer scientists and AI researchers in the 1980's in order to describe aspects of knowledge appearing in distributed and knowledge-based computer systems ( 9, 27] ). Formally, epistemic logic is treated as follows. The language is obtained by taking classical (propositional) logic augmented by a clause for the knowledge or belief operator. We assume a set P of atomic propositions.
De nition 3. The reason that for modelling knowledge the accessibility relation is taken to be an equivalence relation, can be understood as follows: the agent, being in a state, considers a set of alternatives which contains the state he is in (so the agent considers his true state as an alternative) and which are all alternatives of each other.
For belief this would be too strong: in particular, for belief it is not reasonable to assume that the agent always considers his true state as an alternative, since he may be mistaken. So, for belief, weaker assumptions are assumed, which nevertheless result in a number of interesting validities below.
De nition 3.4 (Interpretation of epistemic / doxastic formulas.) In order to determine whether an epistemic (doxastic) formula is true in a model/state pair M w (if so, we write M w j = '), we stipulate: M w j = p i #(w)(p) = true, for p 2 P
The logical connectives are interpreted as usual.
M w j = K'(B') i M w 0 j = ' for all w 0 with R(w w 0 ) Remark 3.5 The last clause can be understood as follows: an agent knows (believes) a formula to be true if the formula is true in all the epistemic alternatives that the agent considers at the state he is in (represented by the accessibility relation).
De nition 3.6 (validity.) Validity of a formula with respect to a model M = hW # Ri is dened as: M j = ' , M w j = ' for all w 2 M.
Validity of a formula is de ned as validity with respect to all models: j = ' , M j = ' for all models M of the form considered.
Validities in epistemic logic with respect to the given models (which we will refer to the`axioms' of knowledge) are:
The rst axiom says that knowledge is closed under implication: if both the implication ' ! and the antecedent ' is known then also the conclusion is known. This is of course a very`idealised' property of knowledge, but its validity is at the very heart of using so-called normal modal logic as we do here. (If one wants to deny this property, one has to resort to`nonstandard' approaches, cf . 27] .) The second axiom expresses that knowledge is true. (One cannot honestly, truthfully and justi ably state to know something that is false.) The third and fourth axioms express a form of introspection: the agent knows what it knows, in the sense that it knows that it knows something (the second axiom), and, moreover, it knows what it does not know (the third axiom). Of course, this may be very unrealistic to assume for some intelligent agents, such as humans, but often it makes sense to assume it in the case of arti cial agents, either by virtue of their nitary nature or by way of some idealisation. In any case it makes life easier, since the resulting logic, called S5, is very elegant (has relatively simple models) and enjoys several pleasant properties ( 27] ).
With respect to doxastic logic we obtain the following validities:
Proposition 3.9 j = B(' ! ) ! (B' ! B ) j = :Bff j = B' ! BB' j = :B' ! B:B' Remark 3.10 Again we observe the introspection properties, but the second axiom now states that an agent's belief is not inconsistent, which is weaker than the property that belief should be true. Also note the rst axiom which states that also belief is closed under implication, which may be regarded as even`more idealised' a property than for knowledge! (Again see 27] for alternatives.)
One may wonder whether the knowledge and belief modalities are interrelated in some meaningful way. Although in the literature (for example 21, 17, 38, 39]), and indeed also in several versions (e.g. in 24], Chapter 5) of the richer KARO logic, which we will encounter in the sequel, several interesting possibilities for such an interaction have been investigated, we will assume in this paper only the natural (but see 38, 39]) property that knowledge implies belief: K' ! B'.
Desires and Intentions
Besides knowledge and belief there are several other modalities which may be of interest in the context of (multi-) agent systems. The rst that comes to mind perhaps is that agents may also be endowed with desires that motivate them to perform actions. The philosopher Bratman has argued that to capture the essence of intelligent agents one must go a step beyond this: also intentions have to be included in the description of the mental state of an agent. Intentions must be viewed as wishes that are committed to by the agent ( 1] ). This is important, Bratman argues, for coherent behaviour. For example, consider an agent that wishes to prepare eggs for a meal. Suppose it desires both a hard-boiled egg and a scrambled, fried one, but it has only the disposal of one egg. Then it has to make a choice: either boil it or scramble and fry it, and moreover, if it has made this choice it determines plans for the future to realise its wishes, and it is important to stay committed to the choice(s) made earlier. For example, it makes little sense to rst boil the egg and then try to scramble it, or rst scramble it and then boil it. Once one of the two wishes has been selected (committed to) the agent must stick to the realisation of it without switching to the other wish at a moment that this cannot be realised any more! Thus, intentions provide what Bratman calls a \screen of admissibility" for adopting other intentions.
In the following sections we discuss three logics in which the notion of intention is formalised, but before we go into the details of these rather complicated logics where also notions of actions and/or time play a role, we rst consider motivational modalities such as desires and intentions in isolation.
In principle we could extend the epistemic (or doxastic) logic from the previous section to a multi-modal logic of, say, belief, desires and intention by adding modal operators D and I for desires and intentions, respectively.
We would then obtain a rather simple extension of the logical framework of the previous framework, which we shall call a`bdi' logic for the moment (for belief, desires and intentions):
De nition 4. The only thing is that now we have three accessibility relations on the set of states. For the belief-related one the interpretation is as before for the desire-related one the accessibility relation points at states that arè desired' (from the perspective of the current state of evaluation, while the intention-related accessibility relation yields states that are`intended' alternatives of the current state / world. The constraint on B is the same as before (for the same reasons as before), whereas the constraints on D I are much weaker: for I it is assumed that the relation is serial, that is, there is always at least one`intended alternative' state (resulting in the property below that intentions are not inconsistent), while for D we do not require any constraint (which implies that desires may even be inconsistent).
Given these models, the interpretation of bdi formulas is as expected:
De nition 4.4 (Interpretation of bdi formulas.) In order to determine whether a bdi formula is true in a model/state pair M w (if so, we write M w j = '), we stipulate: M w j = p i #(w)(p) = true, for p 2 P
The logical connectives are interpreted as usual. Using the same de nition of validity as before, we thus obtain the same properties for belief as before, and the following for desire and belief:
The properties for desire and intention are rather weak. This is due to the weak constraints we have put on the accessibility relations for these modal operators. We observe that intentions are not inconsistent, while both for intention and desire we have closure under implications again (which may again be viewed as idealisations for rational agents).
In order to really describe the informational and motivational attitudes of agents the present bdi logic is too little expressive. In fact, the very meaning of agent is`acting entity' (from the Latin`agere'). So we need to incorporate the notion of action is some way. In the following approaches proposed in the literature this is done in di erent ways. Another thing that is not treated in the above bdi logic, is whether the notions of belief, desire and intention are related in some way, and if so, how. Also on this issue we will see possible (and really distinct!) answers in the approaches we will treat next. We start with the approach by Cohen and Levesque.
Cohen and Levesque's Logic of Intention
Cohen & Levesque, in an in uential paper 2] on this subject, give a formal analysis of the notion of intention. Their setting is a modal logic with operators for belief and goals, with a possibility to express the performance of actions, which gives the logic the avour of a linear-time temporal logic with extra modalities. In this framework they de ne intentions as certain (persistent) goals. In fact, the formalism is`tiered' in the sense that it contains an`atomic layer' describing beliefs, goals and actions of an agent, and a`molecular layer' in which concepts like intention are de ned in terms of the primitives of the atomic layer.
Thus, Cohen & Levesque's de nition of intention amounts to:
Formally, Cohen and Levesque de ne a logical language by means of the following primitive operators:
We assume a set A of atomic actions (or rather atomic action expressions) with typical elements a b, a set Ag of agent names with typical elements i j, and a set Pred of`atomic' predicate formulas p = P(t1 ::: tn) where P is a predicate symbol and the ti are terms, over a certain xed signature. The set of well-formed formulas with typical elements ' will be de ned below. We also assume a set V ar of variables, with typical elements x y, which includes the sets A and Ag. P is a set of agents E is a set of primitive event types, or events, for short.
Agt 2 E ! P] speci es the agent of an event T Z ! E]: a set of possible worlds (event sequence) B T P Z T is the belief accessibility relation G T P Z T is the goal accessibility relation interprets predicate symbols Remark 5.6 As we have a rst-order base logic, a universe of discourse (or domain) and an interpretation function are needed. We will abuse language by writing (p) if the atomic predicate formula p is true with respect to interpretation . Furthermore, agents are used for interpreting agent names, and events are employed for the interpretation of atomic actions, which are only names (variables). Note that in general it is allowed to map an atomic action to a sequence of events. The function Agt yields the agent involved in an event. The set T is a set of possible worlds, which in this approach take the form of event sequences (courses of events). B and G are the usual belief and goal accessibility relations, here indexed by agents and time point. So, for example, B( i n 0 ) (which in the sequel we shall write as h niB i] 0 ) denotes that the world and 0 are belief-related with respect to agent i and time n. The constraints above has as a consequence that the following are validities in the logic: They explain it as follows: if an agent believes something currently it is not rational for him to want it to be false currently: \agents do not choose what they cannot change". We will see that in other approaches (like the KARO framework) the goal modality has another meaning (viz. a chosen wish to let something be true, not currently, but in the future! In this case the current validity of belief implies goal is not desirable any more.)
As to the other operators we have, for example:
Next Cohen and Levesque de ne achievement goals by means of the primitives:
De nition 5.14 (Achievement goals.) AGOAL i ' = GOAL i (LATER ')^BEL i :' Remark 5.15 So an achievement goal is something that is desired for the future (it is a goal that it will later be true) but is currently believed to be false.
Persistent goals are now de ned as special achievement goals:
De nition 5.16 (Persistent goals.)
17 So a persistent goal is an achievement goal that the agent will not give up until he thinks it has been satis ed, or until he thinks it will never be true.
Persistent goals enjoy the following properties:
The rst property says that also persistent goals are consistent. The second one states that if an agent adopts a persistent goal, eventually he must believe it to be true, or believe that it will never become true. The third is a more complicated property: it says that if someone has a persistent goal of bringing about ', ' is within his area of competence, and, before dropping his goal, the agent will not believe ' will never occur, then eventually ' will become true. ! INTEND1 i a Remark 5.23 The rst of these properties expresses that intention provide a \screen of admissibility" for adopting other intentions: if an agent has an intention to do , and the agent (always) believes that doing prevents the achievement of , then the agent cannot have the intention to do , or even the intention to do before doing . The second states that agents \track" the success of their attempts to achieve intentions, or in other words, agents keep their intentions after failure. If an agent has the intention to do a and then does something, b, thinking it would bring about the doing of a, but he then comes to believe it did not, then, provided the agent does not think a can never be done, the agent still has the intention to perform a.
The It expresses rstly that when an agent intends to bring about a certain state of a airs ', it is committed to do a sequence of events (denoted by) a himself, after which ' holds. To avoid that this happens accidentally or unknowingly, we furthermore require that the agent believes he is about to do some action (`plan') b which will have ' as a result. Finally it is speci ed that prior to doing a an agent does not have as a goal a's not bringing about ', i.e. what in fact does happen (a) is compatible with the agent's goals.
Although the theory of Cohen and Levesque yields a very interesting account of the motivational attitudes, in particular intentions, of agents, we observe, especially from the last de nitions and propositions, that one has to deal with action in a rather roundabout way, rendering the theory rather complicated. In our opinion this may primarily be due to the fact that the logic is based on a temporal rather than an actionbased framework, although it is also clear that the notions that Cohen We will now go brie y into some of the formal details. (The language of) BDI logic is constructed as follows. Two types of formulas are distinguished: state formulas and path formulas. We assume some given rst-order signature. Furthermore, we assume a set E of event types with typical element e. The are path formulas Remark 6.2 As the names suggest, a state formulas will be interpreted over a state, that is a (state of the) world at a particular point in time, while path formulas will be interpreted over / along a path of a time tree (representing the evolution of a world). In the sequel we will see how this will be done formally. Here we just give the informal readings of the operators.
As the names suggest the operators succeeded and failed are used to express that events have (just) succeeded and failed, respectively. As in the framework of Cohen & Levesque action-like entities should be given a place in the theory by means of additional operators. Here we see that Rao & George 's approach also account for the distinction of trying an action / event and succeeding versus failing. With the latter one may think of several things: either the agent tried to do some action which failed due to circumstances in the environment. For example, for an action`grip' to be successful there should be an object to be gripped for a motor to be started there should be fuel, etc. perhaps there is also some internal capacity missing needed for successful performance of an action: again for an action`grip' to be successful the robot should have a gripper. All this is related to the infamous quali cation problem in AI complicated. Of course, we have possible worlds again, but as we will see below, these are not just unstructured elements, but they are each time trees, describing possible ows of time. So, we also need time points and an ordering on them. As BDI logic is based on branching time, the ordering need not be linear in the sense that all time points are related in this ordering. However, it is stipulated that the time ordering is serial (every time point has a successor in the time ordering), the ordering is transitive and backwards-linear, which means that every time point has only one direct predecessor. The accessibility relations for the`BDI'-modalities are standard apart from the fact that they are also time-related, that is to say that worlds are (belief/goal/intend-)accessible with respect to a time point. Another way of viewing this is that { for all three modalities { for every time point there is a distinct accessibility relation between worlds. Next we elaborate on the structure of the possible worlds. Furthermore it is indicated by means of the functions Sw and Fw how events are associated with adjacent time points. Now we come to the formal interpretation of formulas on the above models. Naturally we distinguish state formulas and path formulas, since the former should be interpreted on states whereas the latter are interpreted on paths. In the sequel we use the notion of a fullpath: a fullpath in a world w is an in nite sequence of time points such that, for all i, Rao & George now discuss a number of properties that may be desirable to have as axioms. In the following we use to denote so-called O-formulas, which are formulas that contain no positive occurrences of the`inevitable' operator (or negative occurrences of`optional") outside the scope of the modal operators BEL GOAL and INTEND. 5 . GOAL(') ! BEL(GOAL(')) 6 . INTEND(') ! GOAL(INTEND(')) 7. done(e) ! BEL(done(e)) 8 . INTEND(') ! inevitable (:INTEND(')) Remark 6.11 In order to render these formulas validities further constraints should be put on the models, since in the general setting above these are not yet valid. For reasons of space we will not enter into the details here for these the reader is referred to 31, 32, 40] .
Looking at the rst formula above it is intriguing to observe that Rao & George seem to propose the converse of a validity in the logic of Cohen & Levesque. This may seem rather puzzling. However, although there is de nitely something strange about this, it should be kept in mind that, rst of all, the formula GOAL( ) ! BEL( ) is only proposed as a desired validity for certain formulas (viz. O-formulas) and not for all formulas, and also that the framework here (based on branching time) is quite di erent from that in Cohen & Levesque (which is based on linear time). Moreover, the very formulas for which the validity is wanted (the O-formulas) are typical branching-time formulas: they allow positive occurrence of`optional' outside the scope of the doxastic and motivational modalities, thus they typically may express properties that hold along a branch (and not along all branches)! Of course, the very fact that here we have a formula as a proposed validity that is the converse of one proposed by Cohen & Levesque raises the question whether the notions of belief and goal that are modelled in both approaches are the same. I believe they are not, but it is very hard to put the exact di erences into words. I invite the reader to ponder about this further. In any case Rao & George try to make the formula above (which they call`belief-goal compatibility') plausible by considering a typical O-formula of the form optional( ), and then note that if it is a goal that something is optional (true in some future) then it should also be believed that it is optional (true in some future). This, indeed, sounds plausible in the sense that a rational and realistic agent would adhere to it. But also objective (nonmodal) formulas are O-formulas, and whether this is also plausible for these formulas I'm not sure. Perhaps for objective formulas we could say that if something is a goal now it must coincide with a belief now (thus resulting in the validity GOAL(p) $ BEL(p) for objective formulas p), since nothing can be done about it anymore (there is no future left in which we could work on it). This would reconcile for this class of formulas the approaches of Rao & George and Cohen & Levesque. For objective formulas goals trivialize to beliefs.
The second formula is a similar one to the rst. This one is called goalintention compatibilty, and is defended by Rao & George by stating that if an optionality is intended it should also be wished (a goal in their terms). So, Rao & George have a kind of selection lter in mind: intentions (or rather intended options) are ltered / selected goals (or rather goal (wished) options), and goal options are selected believed options. If one views it this way, it looks rather close to Cohen & Levesque's Intention is choice (chosen / selected wishes) with commitment, or loosely, wishes that are committed to. Here the commitment acts as a lter.
The third one says that the agent really does the primitive actions that s/he intends to do. This means that if one adopts this as an axiom the agent is not allowed to do something else ( rst). (In my opinion this is rather strict on the agent, since it may well be that postponing its intention for a while is also an option.) On the other hand, as Rao & George say, the agent may also do things that are not intended since the converse does not hold. And also nothing is said about the intention to do complex actions.
The fourth, fth and seventh express that the agent is conscious of its intentions, goals and what primitive action he has done in the sense that he believes what he intends, has as a goal and what primitive action he has just done.
The sixth one says something like that intentions are really wished for: if something is an intention then it is a goal that it is an intention.
The eighth formula states that intentions will inevitably (in every possible future) be dropped eventually, so there is no in nite deferral of its intentions. This leaves open, whether the intention will be ful lled eventually, or will be given up for other reasons. Below we will discuss several possibilities of giving up intentions according to di erent types of commitment an agent may have.
BDI-logical expressions can be used to characterize di erent types of agents. Rao & George mention the following possibilities:
Remark 6.12 A blindly committed agent maintains his intentions to inevitably obtaining eventually something until he actually believes that that something has been ful lled. A single-minded committed agent is somewhat more exible: he maintains his intention until he believes he has achieved it or he does not believe that it can be reached (it is still an option in some future) anymore. Finally, the open minded committed agent is even more exible: he can also drop his intention if it is not a goal (desire) anymore. Rao & George are then able to obtain results under which conditions the various types of committed agents will reach their intentions. For example, for a blindly committed agent it holds that under the assumption of the axioms we have discussed earlier that:
INTEND(inevitable( ')) ! inevitable( BEL(')) expressing that if the agent intends to eventually obtain ' it will inevitably eventually believe that it has succeeded in achieving '.
KARO Logic
In this section we turn to our own formalisation of BDI-like notions, viz. the KARO formalism, in which action rather than time, together with knowledge / belief, is the primary concept, on which other agent notions are built. The KARO framework has been developed in a number of papers (e.g. 25, 26, 18, 28] ) as well as the thesis of Van Linder ( 24] ).
The KARO formalism is an amalgam of dynamic logic and epistemic / doxastic logic, augmented with several additional (modal) operators in order to deal with the motivational aspects of agents. So, besides operators for knowledge (K) , belief (B) and action ( ], \after performance of it holds that"), there are additional operators for ability (A) and desires (D). Here the formulas generated by the second ( ) part are referred to as actions (or rather action expressions). Here R is de ned as usual in dynamic logic by induction from the basic case Ra (cf. e.g. 14, 24, 18] , but now on model/state pairs rather than just states). Likewise the function C is lifted to sets of complex actions ( 24, 18] ). Remark 7.6 We observe the by now familiar clauses for knowledge, belief and desire. The action modality gets a similar interpretation: something (necessarily) holds after the performance / execution of action if it holds in all the situations that are accessible from the current one by doing the action . The only thing which is a bit nonstandard is that, as stated above, a situation is characterised here as a model / state pair. The interpretations of the ability and commitment operators are rather trivial in this setting (but see the footnotes): an action is enabled (or rather: the agent is able to do the action) if it is indicated so by the function C, and, likewise, an agent is committed to an action if it is recorded so in the agent's agenda.
Furthermore, we will make use of the following syntactic abbreviations serving as auxiliary operators:
De nition 7.7 (dual) h i' = : ]:', expressing that the agent has the opportunity to perform resulting in a state where ' holds.
(opportunity) O = h itt, i.e., an agent has the opportunity to do an action i there is a successor state w.r.t. the R -relation (practical possibility) P( ') = A ^O ^h i', i.e., an agent has the practical possibility to do an action with result ' i it is both able and has the opportunity to do that action and the result of actually doing that action leads to a state where ' holds (can) Can( ') = KP( '), i.e., an agent can do an action with a certain result i it knows it has the practical possibilty to do so (realisability) 3' = 9a1 : : : anP(a1 : : : an ') 5 , i.e., a state property ' is realisable i there is a nite sequence of atomic actions of which the agent has the practical possibility to perform it with the result '
(goal) G' = :'^D'^3', i.e., a goal is a formula that is not (yet) satis ed, but desired and realisable. 6 (possible intend) I( ') = Can( ')^KG', i.e., an agent (possibly) intends an action with a certain result i the agent can do the action with that result and it moreover knows that this result is one of its goals.
Remark 7.8
The dual of the (box-type) action modality expresses that there is at least a resulting state where a formula ' holds. It is important to note that in the context of deterministic actions, i.e. actions that have at most one successor state, this means that the only state satises ', and is thus in this particular case a stronger assertion than its dual formula ]', which merely states that if there are any successor states they will (all) statisfy '. Note also that if atomic actions are assumed to be deterministic all actions including the complex ones will be deterministic. Opportunity to do an action is modelled by having at least one successor state according to the accessibility relation associated with the action. Practical possibility to to an action with a certain result is modelled as having both ability and opportunity to do the action with the appropriate result. Note that O in the formula A ^O ^h i' is actually redundant since it already follows from h i'. However, to stress the opportunity aspect it is added. The Can predicate applied to an action and formula expresses that the agent is`conscious' of its practical possibility to do the action resulting in a state where the formula holds.
A formula ' is realisable if there is a`plan' consisting of (a sequence of) atomic actions of which the agent has the practical possibility to do them with ' as a result. A formula ' is a goal in the KARO framework if it is not true yet, but desired and realisable in the above meaning, that is, there is a plan of which the agent has the practical possibility to realise it with ' as a result. An agent is said to (possibly) intend an action with result ' if he
Can do this (knows that he has the practical possibility to do so), and, moreover, knows that ' is a goal.
In order to manipulate both knowledge / belief and motivational matters special actions revise, commit and uncommit are added to the language. (We assume that we cannot nest these operators. So, e.g., commit (uncommit ) is not a well-formed action expression. For a proper de nition of the language the reader is referred to 28] .) The semantics of these are again given as model/state transformers (We only do this here in a very abstract manner, viewing the accessibility relations associated with these actions as functions. For further details we refer to e.g. 24, 18, 28] 
De nition 7.9 (Accessibility of revise, commit and uncommit actions.) The interpretation of formulas containing revise and (un)commit actions is now done using the accessibility relations above. One can now de ne validity as usual with respect to the KARO-models. One then obtains the following validities (of course, in order to be able to verify these one should use the proper model and not the abstraction we have presented here.) Besides the familiar properties from epistemic / doxastic logic, typical properties of this framework, called the KARO logic, include (cf. 25, 28] Remark 7.12 The rst of these properties says that having the opportunity to do a sequential composition of two actions amounts to having the opportunity of doing the rst action rst and then having the opportunity to do the second. The second states that an agent that can do a sequential composition of two actions with result ' i the agent can do the rst actions resulting in a state where it has the practical possibility to do the second with ' as result. The third expresses that a revision with ' results in a belief of '. The fourth states that the revision with ' results in inconsistent belief i the agent knows :' for certain. The fth expresses that revisions with formulas that are known to be equivalent have identical results. The sixth asserts that if an agent possibly intends to do with some result ', it has the opportunity to commit to with result that it is committed to (i.e. is put into its agenda). The seventh says that if an agent intends to do with a certain purpose, then it is unable to uncommit to it (so, if it is committed to it has to perservere in it). The eighth property says that if an agent is committed to an action and it has the opportunity to uncommit to it with as result that indeed the commitment is removed. The ninth says that whenever an agent is committed to an action that is no longer known to be practically possible, it knows that it can undo this impossible commitment. The tenth property states that commitments are known to the agent. The last four properties have to do with commitments to complex actions. For instance, the eleventh says that if an agent is committed to a sequential composition of two actions then it is committed to the rst one, and it knows that after doing the rst action it will be committed to the second action.
8 Logics for Multi-Agent Systems
Multi-agent epistemic logic
In previous section we have concentrated mainly on single agents and how to describe them. Of course, if multiple agents are around, things become both more complicated as well as more interesting. To start with, with respect to the epistemic (doxastic) aspect, one can introduce epistemic (doxastic) operators for every agent, resulting in a multi-modal logic, called S5n. Models for this logic are inherently less simple and elegant as those for the single agent case (cf. 27]). So then one has indexed operators Ki and Bi for agent i's knowledge and belief, respectively.
But one can go on and de ne knowledge operators that involve a group of agents in some way. This gives rise to the notions of common and (distributed) group knowledge.
Remark 8.5 The rst statement of this proposition shows that the`everybody knows' modality is indeed what its name suggests. The next four says that common knowledge has at least the properties of knowledge: closed under implication, it is true, and enjoys the introspective properties. The sixth property says that common knowledge is known by everybody. The last is a kind of induction principle: the premise gives the condition under which one can`upgrade the truth of ' to common knowledge of ' this premise expresses that it is common knowledge that the truth of ' is known by everybody.
As to multi-agent doxastic logic one can look at similar notions of everybody believes' and common belief. 
Multi-agent BDI logic
Also with respect to the other modalities one may consider multi-agent aspects. In this subsection we focus on the notion of collective or joint intentions. We follow ideas from 6] (but we give a slightly di erent though equivalent presentation of de nitions). We now assume that we have belief and intention opertors Bi Ii for every agent 1 i n.
First we enrich the language of multi-agent doxastic with operators E I (everybody intends) and M I (mutual intention). (We call this a multiagent BDI logic, although multi-agent BI logic would be a more adequate name, since we leave out the modality of desire / goal.)
De nition 8.12 (multi-agent BDI logic.) Multi-agent BDI logic is obtained by taking the (analogous clauses of) multi-agent doxastic logic of the previous subsection extended with the clauses:
if ' is a multi-agent BDI formula, then so is Ii' for every 1 i n). In this context we also mention the work of Singh 35] where multiagent intentions are studied. An interesting distinction is made between exodeictic and endodeictic intentions of groups, where the former is`pointing outward' (intention of the group as viewed by others) while the latter is`pointing inward' (intention as viewed by the group itself). Technically Singh uses modal operators for intentions and commitments, and bases group intentions on the accessibility relations for the individual ones, where exodeictic and endodeictic intentions are treated in a di erent way, amounting to the following. A team exodeictically intends ' i ' holds on all paths that satisfy the exodeictic intentions of the individual members of the team and satisfy the team structure requirements (as to commitments and coordination of interactions), while a team endodeictically intends ' i ' holds on all paths that satisfy the endodeictic intentions of the individual members of the team, satisfy the team structure requirements, and require that the members are committed to the team in bringing about that '.
Although a logic of common goals, intentions and commitments is important, such a logic generally does not say much about how these come about. These typically come about in a (social) process (e.g. by negotiation), and therefore notions like goal formation are procedural rather than declarative of nature. For instance, in Dignum and Conte 3] a sketch is given how goal formation comes about, using a logical framework which is BDI/KARO-like (based on an action logic) extended with operators for instrumentality (to talk about subgoals) and obligations (for the normative aspect).
Further developments: cooperation and normative behaviour
If one considers`societies of agents' obviously also other notions become important besides mere multi-agent extensions of BDI-notions. For instance, one can investigate hoe communication takes place in such a system, and how this a ects the mental states of the agents in the system. This in turn, is important for synchronisation, coordination and cooperation in the system. There has also been done some work on this. For example, Dignum and Van Linder 4] have extended the KARO framework to deal with speech acts. Moreover, in societies it may be important to consider norms, obligations and permissions as a way to control societal behaviour. By introducing deontic notions such as obligation, permission and prohibition, Dignum et al. 5] try to make the logical framework su cientl expressive to treat this issue. In particular they consider how agents may take norms and obligations into account when deliberating its intentions (by means of a modi ed`BDI loop').
Conclusion
In this paper we have reviewed a number of logical theories for describing intelligent agents. First we looked at single agents and considered logics for informational and motivational attitudes such as belief, desires and intentions. In particular we have discussed the theories of Cohen & Levesque, Rao & George and the KARO framework of Van Linder et al. Finally we turned to multi-agent logics and discussed multi-agent epistemic and doxastic logic, multi-agent BDI logic and some developments with respect to even more expressive logics in which one may express some more advanced societal issues such as norms, obligations and communication by speech acts.
